Harman on Mental Paint and the Transparency of Experience by Demircioglu, Erhan
Organon F 27 (1) 2020: 56–81 ISSN 2585-7150 (online) 
https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27103 ISSN 1335-0668 (print) 
* Koç University 
  Department of Philosophy, Koç University, Rumelifeneri Yolu, 34450 Sarıyer – 
Istanbul, Turkey 
  erdemircioglu@ku.edu.tr 
© The Author. Journal compilation © The Editorial Board, Organon F. 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attri-
bution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0). 
RESEARCH ARTICLE 
 Harman on Mental Paint and the Transparency  
of Experience 
Erhan Demircioglu* 
Received: 23 January 2019 / Accepted: 26 June 2019 
Abstract: Harman famously argues that a particular class of anti-
functionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states 
or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distin-
guishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the 
experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not in-
trospectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Har-
man argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the 
properties of the object of an experience but not the properties of the 
experience of an object and hence that the fact that functionalism 
leaves out the properties of the experience of an object does not show 
that it leaves out anything mentally relevant. In this paper, I argue 
that Harman’s attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments in 
question is unsuccessful. After making a distinction between the the-
sis of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint 
transparency, (and casting some doubt on the former,) I mainly tar-
get the latter and argue that it is false. The thesis of mental-paint 
transparency is false, I claim, not because mental paint involves some 
introspectively accessible properties that are different from the prop-
erties of the objects of experiences but because what I call the identity 
thesis is true, viz. that mental paint is the same as (an array of) 
properties of the object of experience. The identification of mental 
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paint with properties of the object of experience entails that the anti-
functionalist arguments Harman criticizes cannot be rightly accused 
of committing the fallacy of confusing the two.  
Keywords: Functionalism; intentionalism; transparency of experi-
ence; mental paint; Gilbert Harman. 
 
 Harman (1990) famously argues that a particular class of arguments 
against functionalism about mental states or events (in particular, percep-
tual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object 
of experience from properties of the experience of an object” (31).1 Func-
tionalism is broadly defined as the view that mental states such as a per-
ceptual experience as of seeing something red should be exclusively ac-
counted for in terms of their relations, relations between those mental states 
and perceptual input, relations between those mental states and other men-
tal states, and relations between those mental states and behavioral output. 
The arguments belonging to the class Harman addresses against function-
alism rely on as their major premise the thesis that introspective awareness 
(or attention) reveals that perceptual experiences have some intrinsic qual-
ities, qualities they have “apart from their relations to other things” (33), 
and conclude on the basis of this idea that given its exclusive concern with 
the relational features of perceptual experiences, functionalism leaves out 
and cannot account for those intrinsic qualities.2 Harman’s reply is, in its 
essentials, to reject the major premise and maintain that “when we clearly 
distinguish properties of the object of experience from properties of experi-
ence, we see that we are not aware of the relevant intrinsic features of the 
experience” (49) but aware only of “what are experienced as intrinsic fea-
tures of the intentional object of experience” (39). And, if the major premise 
in question is false, as Harman claims it is, then “the fact that functionalism 
                                                 
1  All page references that follow are to this seminal work, unless otherwise  
noted.  
2  In this paper, I will be almost exclusively concerned with visual experiences (rat-
her than other sorts of perceptual experiences or mental states in general); and by 
“experience” or “perceptual experience,” I will solely mean visual experience inclu-
ding deceptive as well as veridical experience, unless otherwise noted.  
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abstracts from the intrinsic character of experience does not show it leaves 
out anything you are aware of” (41).  
 The object of one’s experience is, on Harman’s account, the object one’s 
experience represents as being in a certain way.3 The object of my current 
visual experience, for instance, is the coffee cup on my desk which my per-
ceptual experience represents as being red, being located “in front of” the 
board marker, subtending a particular angle “from here,” and so on. The 
properties of the object of my experience are the properties my experience 
represents it as having (or, equivalently, the properties I experience it as 
having).4 Among these properties of the object of my experience are those 
properties my experience represents its object as having intrinsically (or 
apart from its relations to other things in my visual field or to me), and its 
redness stands out at least as a plausible candidate for being an intrinsic 
property of (the surface of) the coffee cup (and let us assume, for the sake 
of the argument, that it is an intrinsic property of [the surface of] the coffee 
cup).  
 Given Harman’s conception of experience as a form of representation, 
the distinction he wishes to draw between the properties of the object of 
experience and the properties of the experience of an object amounts to 
being a specific version of the more generic distinction between the proper-
ties of a represented object and the properties of a representation of that 
object, in which case some other specific versions of the latter might prove 
useful in understanding the former. Harman thus writes: 
(In a painting of a unicorn) the unicorn is pictured as having 
four legs and a single horn. The painting of the unicorn does 
                                                 
3  In his paper, Harman assumes, unproblematically given his purposes, that the 
intentionality of experiences is to be accounted for in representational terms (34). 
I will adopt the same assumption in this paper, and use such locutions as “the object 
of experience,” “the object represented by the experience,” “what the experience 
represents,” and “the object the experience is of” interchangeably.  
4  Harman writes: “When you attend to […] your experience of the redness of an 
apple, you are attending to […] a quality of the apple” (41, emphasis mine). My 
experience of the redness of an apple is an experience that represents the apple as 
red, and to say that the apple being the object of my experience is red is to say 
that my experience represents its object, the apple, as red (more on this below).  
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not have four legs and a single horn. The painting is flat and 
covered with paint. The unicorn is not pictured as flat or cov-
ered with paint. Similarly, an imagined unicorn is imagined as 
having legs and a horn. The imagining of the unicorn has no 
legs or horn. The imagining of the unicorn is a mental activity. 
The unicorn is not imagined as either an activity or anything 
mental. (35) 
Just as we need to distinguish the properties of the object represented, on 
different occasions, by the painting and the imagining, which is in this case 
the properties of the unicorn, from the properties of what is doing the rep-
resenting (i.e., the painting and the imagining), we also need to distinguish 
the properties of the coffee cup represented by my visual experience from 
the properties of what is doing the representing (i.e., my experience). Fur-
thermore, just as the unicorn pictured and imagined on these occasions can 
be plausibly thought of as having four legs intrinsically and neither the 
picture, we can suppose, nor the imagining is four-legged, my experience of 
the coffee cup might well not be red despite its object being intrinsically 
red. So, that my experience is intrinsically red does not follow from the fact 
that its object is intrinsically red, and a fortiori, it is false that if the object 
of my experience is intrinsically red, introspective awareness shall reveal 
that my experience itself is intrinsically red. 
 Harman’s distinction between the properties of the experienced object 
and the properties of the experience establishes that the properties of the 
experienced object are not necessarily properties of the experience, but it 
falls short of establishing that they never are. This is because the more 
generic distinction between the properties of the represented object and 
the properties of the representation of that object does not exclude the 
possibility that there are cases in which those two sets of properties coin-
cide. In fact, there are some clear cases in which the two coincide. So, for 
instance, the color of the unicorn represented by the painting is (non-
accidentally) the same as the color of that part of the painting of the 
unicorn representing the color of the unicorn: if this unicorn is represented 
as white in the painting, (the relevant part of) the painting qua the rep-
resentation is also white (and non-accidentally so). This means that  
the argument against functionalism from the intrinsic properties of  
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experiences has not yet been fully defused at this stage of the dialectic, 
by the distinction between the properties of the experienced object and 
the properties of the experience. There is still room for the proponent of 
the argument to argue that some intrinsic properties like redness might 
well be of both the experienced object and the experience, in which case 
the argument from the intrinsic properties of experiences may proceed as 
before. 
 A proponent of an argument from the intrinsic properties of experi-
ences does not need the thesis that all properties of the experienced object 
are necessarily the properties of the experience but could work with the 
weaker thesis that they sometimes are. Given this, the success of the at-
tempt to defuse that argument requires further considerations to be 
brought in. And, this is where Harman appeals, though he never uses the 
term in the paper, to the transparency of visual experiences.5 His famous 
illustration of Eloise turning her attention to her visual experience of the 
tree goes like this: 
When Eloise sees a tree before her, the colors she experiences are 
all experienced as features of the tree and its surroundings. None 
of them are experienced as intrinsic features of her experience. 
Nor does she experience any features of anything as intrinsic fea-
tures of her experience. And this is true of you too. (39) 
Harman’s distinction between the properties of the experienced object and 
the properties of the experience discloses a possible ambiguity in the major 
premise of a particular class of anti-functionalist arguments, viz. that 
when we have perceptual experiences, we are introspectively aware of 
                                                 
5  The use of the term ‘transparency’ in the context of philosophical discussions 
about the nature of visual experiences dates back to Moore (1903), which says the 
following regarding “the sensation of blue:” “The term blue is easy enough to distin-
guish, but the other element which I have called ‘consciousness’—that which sen-
sation of blue has in common with sensation of green—is extremely difficult to fix 
[…] And, in general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact seems to 
escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be transparent, we look through it 
and see nothing but the blue” (Moore 1903, 446). The term’s wide currency in the 
recent literature owes to Tye (1992).  
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(the) intrinsic properties (of something); and, it makes clear that those ar-
guments can only be successful if the properties we are thus introspectively 
aware of are not only the properties of the experienced object but also the 
properties of the experience.6 It is at the next stage, however, Harman’s 
defusing attempt is completed, where it is maintained that our introspective 
findings tell us that the only properties to turn our attention to in such 
phenomenological inspections are properties of the experienced objects. Ac-
cording to Harman, we have “no access at all” (39) to the intrinsic proper-
ties of our experiences.  
 What exactly is it that we can never be aware of when we try to turn 
our attention to our experiences? There are two possible candidates here, 
depending on whether one takes as one’s model for the representational 
aspects of visual experience the imagining of a unicorn or the painting of 
a unicorn. The imagining of a unicorn, as Harman notes, is “a mental 
activity” (35) whose intentional object is a unicorn; and, if we understand 
the transparency of visual experiences along the dimension of such “activ-
ities,” then it amounts to the thesis that when we try to turn our attention 
to our visual experiences of objects, we can never be aware of the intrinsic 
properties of the experiencing of those objects. Let me call this thesis the 
thesis of experiencing-act transparency. On the other hand, the painting 
of a unicorn is not an activity (notwithstanding the ambiguity of the term 
‘painting’), let alone a mental activity (though it seems to require some), 
but, well, “a thing” by virtue of the particular pattern of the paint on 
which it takes a unicorn as its intentional object; and, if we understand 
the transparency of visual experiences along the dimension of such 
“things,” then it amounts to the thesis that when we try to turn our 
attention to our visual experiences of objects, we can never be aware of, 
to use Harman’s gripping term (39), the mental paint, those intrinsic prop-
erties (of what one might call the ‘mental canvas’) by virtue of which 
those experiences are experiences of those objects (or represent what they 
                                                 
6  As Harman notes in (1995), introspective awareness in question is “direct” (Har-
man 1995, 75) or “non-inferential.”  
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represent). Let me call this thesis the thesis of mental-paint transpar-
ency.7, 8 
 It seems clear that the thesis of experiencing-act transparency is not 
equivalent to the thesis of mental-paint transparency. Mental paint consists 
                                                 
7  There are two points I want make about the notion of mental paint I adopt in 
this paper. First, Harman himself defines mental paint in the way I have just defined, 
i.e. as an array of properties by virtue of which an experience is of the objects that 
it is of (or represents what it does). Harman writes: “In the case of her visual expe-
rience, I want to say that Eloise is not aware of, as it were, the mental paint by 
virtue of which her experience is an experience of seeing a tree” (39), and in his 
response to Block (1995), “The issue is whether we can become directly or in-
trospectively (as opposed to inferentially) aware of those aspects of perceptual expe-
rience—the mental paint, etc.—that serve to represent what we experience” (Har-
man 1995, 76). 
 Second, the notion of mental paint is sometimes broadly understood as ac-
commodating both properties of the experiencing act and properties by virtue of 
which an experience represents what it does. For instance, Block (2010) writes: “Are 
phenomenological characters of perception—e.g., what it is like to experience redness 
or roundness—philosophically reducible to the redness or roundness of the objects 
one sees or to representation of redness or roundness? If there is no such reduction, 
then there can be said to be mental paint” (Block 2010, 23–24). My use of the notion 
of mental paint is narrower than Block’s; and by “mental paint,” I mean only those 
properties of an experience by virtue of which it represents what it does. 
8  Of course, if experiences are brain states, then there will be more to experiences 
than their objects and the properties of those objects just as there is more to sen-
tences, e.g. their syntactical and morphological features, than the objects and pro-
perties they refer to (Block 1995, 26). The question Harman is dealing with, however, 
is not simply whether there is more to experiences than the properties of their objects 
but what “psychologically relevant” features of an experience are there that we can 
be introspectively aware of. Harman writes: “According to functionalism, the psy-
chologically relevant properties of an internal process are all functional properties […] 
I have been considering the objection that certain intrinsic features of experience 
must be psychologically relevant properties apart from their contribution to function, 
since these are the properties we are or can be aware of” (41–42, emphases mine). 
So, the thesis of mental-paint transparency is better understood as asserting that 
when we try to turn our attention to our visual experiences of objects, we can never 
be aware of those intrinsic “psychologically relevant” (or mental) properties by vir-
tue of which those experiences represent what they do.  
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in those intrinsic features of a visual experience by virtue of which that 
experience has, say, the tree as its object, and it is not by virtue of the 
intrinsic properties of the experiencing act that that experience has the tree 
as its object. The idea that it is by virtue of the intrinsic properties of the 
experiencing act that an experience is of the object that it is of (or repre-
sents what it represents) is inconsistent with the evidently true assumption 
that the very same (kind of) experiencing act can have different objects on 
different occasions (e.g., a tree on one, a coffee cup on another, and so on): 
the very same experiencing act would not be directed towards different 
objects but would always be directed towards the same object if it were by 
virtue of its intrinsic properties that it is directed towards an object. Con-
sider the following analogy. I can kick different objects, say, a soccer ball 
or a basketball. The very same act of my kicking may take different balls 
as its objects. In case I kick the soccer ball rather than the basketball lying 
next to it, it is not by virtue of the intrinsic properties of the kicking act 
that my kicking the soccer ball takes as its object the soccer ball (but not 
the basketball). Similarly, the visual act of experiencing may take different 
things as its objects; and in case it takes a particular thing as its object, it 
is not by virtue of its intrinsic properties that it takes as its object that 
thing (but not another thing). 
 The distinction between the thesis of experiencing-act transparency and 
the thesis of mental-paint transparency enables a suitable taxonomy of some 
visual phenomena that are typically appealed to by the opponents of the 
sort of representationalism advocated by Harman. Two such phenomena 
are blurred vision and double vision. In the case of some typical examples 
of blurred vision, it seems that blurriness is not presented as a property of 
the objects of experience but as a property of the experiencing act itself: 
what introspectively seems to be blurred is not the objects but the experi-
encing itself. So, blurred vision is better conceived as militating against the 
thesis of experiencing-act transparency.9 In the case of some typical exam-
ples of double vision, on the other hand, what introspectively appears to be 
                                                 
9  Smith (2008) writes: “Suppose a myopic person were suddenly to start seeing 
more and more clearly until he ended up with 20/20 vision. This change in experience 
would not be taken by this person to be a change in the features of the objects seen. 
It would immediately be taken for what it is: a change in the character of the visual 
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double seems to be neither the objects of experience nor the experiencing-
act itself but could reasonably be taken as those features of the experience 
by virtue of which the experience represents what it does. So, double vision 
is better interpreted as militating against the thesis of mental-paint trans-
parency.10 
 In order for Harman’s defusing attempt to be successful, both the thesis 
of experiencing-act transparency and the thesis of mental-paint transpar-
ency must be true. If the thesis of experiencing-act transparency is false and 
the visual experiencing of a particular object has intrinsic properties that 
can be identified through introspection, then the anti-functionalist argu-
ments that Harman targets go unscathed by the distinction between the 
properties of the experienced objects and the properties of the experiencing 
act.11 And, if the thesis of mental-paint transparency is false and introspec-
tive awareness reveals the mental paint by virtue of which experiences are 
                                                 
experience itself. Blurriness is not a way that things in the world seem to be. It is, 
however, a feature of experience of which we are usually aware when it is there. The 
Transparency Thesis is therefore false” (Smith 2008, 201). Smith argues that in the 
case of blurred vision, objects are “seen blurrily” (Smith 2008, 202), and therefore, 
Smith’s conclusion that the transparency thesis is false is to be understood as the 
thesis that the thesis of experiencing-act transparency is false. (See also Boghossian 
and Velleman [1989], Pace [2007], and Allen [2013].) 
10  Boghossian and Velleman (1989) write: “If you press the side of one eyeball, you 
can see this line of type twice without seeing the page as bearing two identical lines 
of type. Indeed, you cannot even force the resulting experience into representing the 
existence of two lines, even if you try. Similarly, you can see nearby objects double 
by focusing on distant objects behind them, and yet you cannot get yourself to see 
the number of nearby objects as doubling […] None of these experiences can be ade-
quately described solely in terms of their intentional content. Their description re-
quires reference to areas of color in a visual field, areas that split in two […] without 
anything’s being represented to you as being so” (Boghossian and Velleman 1989, 
94, emphasis mine). I suggest that Boghossian and Velleman are to be understood 
as arguing against the thesis of mental-paint transparency. For a defense of repre-
sentationalism against objections from such visual “oddities” as double vision and 
blurred vision, see Tye (2002).  
11  In his response to Block (1996), Harman writes: “What it is like to see something 
as ahead and to the right is not normally the same as what it is like to hear something 
as ahead and to the right” (Harman 1996, 76). This strongly suggests that Harman 
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experiences of objects that they are actually of, then the anti-functionalist 
arguments in question go unscathed by the distinction between the proper-
ties of the experienced objects and the properties arranged in such a way 
as to constitute the mental paint.  
 My main concern in this paper is the thesis of mental-paint transpar-
ency, but I cannot help making a few (and admittedly quick) critical obser-
vations, some of which are familiar and more persuasive than others, about 
the thesis of experiencing-act transparency, the one that in any case occu-
pies, historically speaking, the more prominent position among the two. 
First, if the experiencing act does not have intrinsic properties that we are 
aware of or can be revealed by introspection, as the thesis of experiencing-
act transparency claims it does not, then it is at least not clear that we can 
plausibly claim that when we turn our attention to our visual experiences, 
we are aware of the properties of the experienced objects. This is, in effect, 
Moore’s main problem in his famous “The Refutation of Idealism” (1903), 
the work which still continues to set the stage for philosophical investiga-
tions into the transparency of experience. In that work, Moore’s putative 
refutation of idealism rests on the thesis that introspective reflection pro-
vides good reason to prefer the act-object model of experience over its com-
petitor (which is what Moore himself calls, somewhat confusingly when 
viewed from the contemporary perspective, “the content view” [Moore 1903, 
447], a forerunner of the adverbial account), and the problem Moore faces 
is why, if experiences have an act-object structure, we do not typically find 
                                                 
is an “intramodal intentionalist” in Byrne’s sense: “Intermodal intentionalists hold, 
while intramodal intentionalists deny, that the phenomenal difference between per-
ceptual modalities—between visual and auditory experiences, for example—is deter-
mined by a difference in content” (Byrne 2001, 205). Intramodal intentionalists ty-
pically account for the phenomenal difference between perceptual modalities by an 
appeal to their distinct functional roles in one’s overall cognitive economy (see Dret-
ske [1995] and Tye [1995]). I do not wish to claim here that the phenomenal diffe-
rence between perceptual modalities cannot be adequately accounted for by a fun-
ctionalist story, but that the anti-functionalist arguments Harman is targeting can 
be undermined solely by making the distinction between properties of the experience 
of the object and properties of the experience of the object (along with the deliveran-
ces of introspection), as Harman intends to do in his (1990), only if the thesis of 
experiencing-act transparency is true.  
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the act component in our introspective queries. Moore assumes, rightly 
I think, that introspection can provide positive support for the act-object 
model only if both components are introspectively accessible, and the ap-
parent resistance of the act component to introspective access appears to 
undermine that model. Moore’s solution is, as far as I can see, captured by 
his following remarks: “Yet it [the experiencing act] can be distinguished if 
we look attentively enough, and if we know that there is something to look 
for” (Moore 1903, 550). So, I take it that for Moore, it is only difficult but 
not impossible to introspectively attend to the act component of experi-
ences.12 The point I wish to make is not that what I take to be Moore’s 
solution to the problem is adequate, but that the very problem he realizes 
and struggles with also afflicts Harman’s view about experiences. The prob-
lem is that it is not clear that we can plausibly adopt the talk of the “ob-
jects” of experiences, as Harman does, without endorsing the act-object 
model because the only plausible answer to the question of what the object 
of an experience should be ‘combined,’ ‘supplemented’ or ‘(inter)penetrated’ 
with in order to get the experience of the object appears to be the experi-
encing act. And, it is at least dubious that we can plausibly presume that 
introspection prefers the act-object model to its rivals (e.g. the adverbial 
model), as Moore himself is so acutely aware, if the act component is not 
introspectively accessible.  
 Secondly, even if we set aside Moore’s problem and grant that the idea 
that experiencing acts are not introspectively accessible looks plausible 
when such acts are inspected intra-modally (within a perceptual modality), 
there are good reasons, as various philosophers have pointed out before, to 
doubt that idea when those acts are inspected inter-modally (across differ-
ent modalities). This is because it is not clear that we can plausibly distin-
guish perceptual modalities as different as vision, tactition, and olfaction, 
without pointing out the intrinsic phenomenological differences between 
acts that accompany those senses, like seeing, touching, and smelling. There 
is, it seems, all the phenomenological difference between seeing and feeling 
a square object; however, given the sameness of the object, it is not clear 
how we can account for the difference without appealing to the intrinsic 
                                                 
12  For an influential defense of this idea, see Kind (2003, 229).  
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phenomenological differences between seeing and touching. It is on the basis 
of such inter-modal considerations Grice (1989), among others, defends the 
introspective accessibility of the intrinsic features of visual experiencing 
when he writes: 
In addition to the specific differences between visual experiences, 
signalized by the various property-words employed, there is a ge-
neric resemblance signalized by the use of the word “look,” which 
differentiates visual from nonvisual sense-experience. This resem-
blance can be noticed and labeled, but perhaps not further de-
scribed. (Grice 1989, 267) 
Furthermore, though Grice’s (mild) skepticism about the prospects of de-
scribing the distinctive characteristic of visual experiences appears to be 
widely shared, some philosophers have gone some significant way towards 
describing the intrinsic phenomenological differences among various sorts of 
perceptual modality. For instance, comparing the main forms of perception 
from what he calls a “purely phenomenological point of view” (Broad 1952, 
30), Broad writes: 
In its purely phenomenological aspect seeing is ostensibly salta-
tory. It seems to leap the spatial gap between the percipient’s 
body and a remote region of space. Then, again, it is ostensibly 
prehensive of the surfaces of distant bodies as colored and ex-
tended, and of external events as color-occurrences localized in 
remote regions of space. In its purely phenomenological aspect 
hearing is ostensibly prehensive, not of bodies, but only of events 
and processes as occurrences of sound-qualities. It is not ostensi-
bly saltatory, for these events or processes are not heard as local-
ized in remote restricted regions of space. They are heard rather 
as emanating from remote centers and pervading with diminish-
ing intensity the surrounding space. (Broad 1952, 32) 
One might agree or disagree with Broad’s observations here (I, for one, am 
inclined to agree with a good portion of them), but their availability counts 
not only against Grice’s (and others’) skepticism about the prospects of 
providing the relevant descriptions but also, and more importantly for the 
purposes of this paper, against the thesis of experiencing-act transparency. 
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This is because if that thesis were true, then Broad would not be able to 
provide the account above of what “phenomenologically” differentiates see-
ing from hearing. Or, we can say this at the least: the fact that Broad, for 
one, has provided an account along the lines above is a formidable challenge 
to the proponent of the thesis of experiencing-act transparency. 
 Thirdly, and finally, if the thesis of experiencing-act transparency is 
true, then it is not clear in virtue of what perceptual experiences are con-
scious. A visual experience of seeing, say, a red object is a (phenomenally) 
conscious experience: there is something it is like to have that experience. 
Now, it cannot be solely in virtue of the redness of that object that the 
experience in question is conscious given the fact that the redness of that 
object is not conscious in any sense of the term: there is nothing it is like 
for that object to be red. The only other candidate that appears to remain 
and we might appeal to is the act component, the visual experiencing-act: 
it must at least in part be in virtue of some intrinsic properties of the visual 
experiencing act that the experience of seeing a red object is conscious. Let 
us call those intrinsic properties of the visual experiencing act by virtue of 
which a visual experience is conscious its conscious properties.13 Now, the 
thesis of experiencing-act transparency claims that the intrinsic properties 
of the visual experiencing act are not introspectible. So, according to this 
thesis, the conscious properties of the experiencing act are not introspecti-
ble. But this is at least confusing because it does not seem that we can make 
sense of the idea that introspection is limited with respect to its power to 
detect conscious properties, that there might be conscious properties that 
are closed in principle to introspection. And this is in turn because it does 
not seem that there is any other criterion for the identification of conscious 
properties than appealing to introspection. This does not mean that intro-
spective awareness is required for consciousness or that it possesses such 
ideal epistemic virtues as infallibility, incorrigibility, or perfect reliability; 
however, it means that introspective accessibility is the arbiter by which 
we can tell conscious properties. Hence the idea that experiencing acts have 
                                                 
13  The notion of conscious properties here is similar to Sundström’s (2018) notion 
of “consciousness properties:” “Consciousness properties are properties that contri-
bute to making up what things are or can be like for subjects” (Sundström 2018, 
681, emphases original).  
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some conscious properties that are in principle introspectively inaccessible 
appears to be barely intelligible.14 
 I now want to turn to the main topic of this paper, the thesis of mental-
paint transparency, viz. that mental paint is not introspectively accessible 
(or that the intrinsic properties by virtue of which visual experiences are of 
the objects they are of are not introspectively accessible). As we have seen, 
Harman’s defense of this thesis rests, in effect, on the distinction between 
the properties of the objects of experience and the mental paint (the prop-
erties by virtue of which experiences are of those objects they are of), and 
the deliverances of his introspective queries. I grant, and agree with Har-
man, that the properties of the objects of experiences are introspectively 
accessible but I want to deny that mental paint is not introspectively ac-
cessible. This is, unlike the main line of opposition to the thesis of mental-
paint transparency one typically finds in the literature, not because mental 
paint involves some introspectively accessible properties that are different 
from the properties of the objects of experiences but because what I shall 
call the identity thesis is true, viz. that the properties of the objects of 
experiences are the properties by virtue of which those experiences are of 
the objects they are of (or represent what they represent).15 The upshot is 
                                                 
14  Compare Goldman’s (1993) “rock objection” to higher-order (thought) theories 
of consciousness: “How could possession of a meta-state confer subjectivity or feeling 
on a lower-level state that didn’t otherwise possess it? Why would being an inten-
tional object or referent of a meta-state confer consciousness on a first-order state? 
A rock does not become conscious when someone has a belief about it. Why should 
a first-order psychological state become conscious simply by having a belief about 
it?” (Goldman 1993, 368) Furthermore, it is worth noting that the intimate tie be-
tween being conscious and being introspectible in principle has nothing much to do 
with Searle’s rather controversial thesis that there are no unconscious-in-principle 
mental states, that “we have no notion of the unconscious except that which is 
potentially conscious” (Searle 1992, 152). 
15  Two points (one clarificatory, the other qualificatory) need to be made here. 
First, the identity thesis is not the thesis that properties of the object of experience 
are identical to properties of the experience of an object but the thesis that properties 
of the object of experience are identical to a subclass of properties of the experience 
of an object (namely, properties by virtue of which an experience represents what it 
does). Surely, a given experience might have a property (like occurring on a certain 
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that Harman’s distinction between properties of the objects of experience 
and mental paint turns out to be a distinction without a difference (while 
the distinction between properties of the objects of experience and proper-
ties of experiencing act need not be and, I believe, is not).  
  Let us go back to my visual experience of the red coffee cup. The object 
of my experience is represented as being red, and given that, for Harman, 
the properties of the object of experience are those properties it is repre-
sented as having, the object of my experience is red. So, one of the proper-
ties of the object of my experience is redness. Now, what are those properties 
of my experience by virtue of which it is of a red object? I maintain that 
redness is one of those properties by virtue of which my experience is of 
a red object because, if the object of my experience were represented not as 
red but, say, as green, then the object of my experience would be green and 
hence my experience would not be of a red object. It is by virtue of redness 
being represented as being instantiated by the object of experience that the 
experience represents what it does (i.e. a red object). If this strikes you as 
truistic, then note that this counts in favor of the identity thesis because if 
the identity thesis is true, then it is truistic. Try to conceive of a visual 
experience whose intentional object is red, and the property by virtue of 
which the experience is of a red object is not redness but greenness. I predict 
that you will feel an immediate difficulty in envisaging a scenario with these 
two features: the idea that the object of the visual experience is red appears 
to “cancel out” the idea that the property by virtue of which the experience 
                                                 
day) that its object does not (or need not) have. Secondly, the identity thesis thus 
clarified needs a qualification, given that properties by virtue of which an experience 
represents what it does might involve a property (like being caused by its object) its 
object does not (or need not) have. The identity thesis suitably qualified may take 
one of the following forms: it is to be understood either as the thesis that properties 
of the object of experience are identical to mental (or, as Harman puts it, psycholo-
gically relevant) properties by virtue of which an experience represents what it does 
(see fn. 8), or as the thesis that properties of the object of experience are among 
properties by virtue of which an experience represents what it does. I will argue that 
the identity thesis qualified in one of these ways undermines Harman’s response to 
the anti-functionalist. For convenience, however, I will suppress the qualification and 
take the identity thesis in its unqualified form, since the qualification has no direct 
bearing on my argument. 
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is of a red object is greenness, and vice versa. Similar observations can be 
made about the shape properties of the objects of experiences. The object 
of my current experience is represented as being coffee-cup shaped, and 
hence, it is coffee-cup shaped. One of its properties is having a coffee-cup 
shape. Now, what are those properties by virtue of which my experience is 
of a coffee-cup shaped object? I maintain that being coffee-cup shaped is 
one of those properties by virtue of which my experience is of a coffee-cup 
shaped object because, if the object of my experience were represented not 
as coffee-cup shaped but, say, as rectangular, then the object of my experi-
ence would be rectangular and hence my experience would not be of a coffee-
cup shaped object. More generally, there is no property that I find in my 
experience in question of the red coffee cup that is a property of the object 
of my experience but not a property by virtue of which my experience is of 
that object. Mental paint qua properties by virtue of which an experience 
is of the object that is of is, as it were, right before our eyes and as intro-
spectively accessible as properties of the object, and this appears to be so 
evidently because mental paint is the same as (an array of) properties of 
the object of experience.  
 The identification of mental paint with properties of the object of expe-
rience should not come as a surprise if a trap that Harman seems to fall 
into here is avoided. Consider a non-transparent representation, for in-
stance, a painting of a unicorn. “In the case of a painting,” Harman notes, 
“Eloise can be aware of those features of the painting that are responsible 
for its being a painting of a unicorn. That is, she can turn her attention to 
the pattern of the paint on the canvas by virtue of which the painting 
represents a unicorn” (39). In the case of a painting of a unicorn, we can, 
Harman maintains, clearly distinguish the vehicle of representation (the 
painting) from the object of representation (the unicorn), and turn our at-
tention from one to the other. However, in the case of a (hallucinatory) 
visual experience of a unicorn, we cannot clearly distinguish the two (the 
mental paint and the unicorn) and turn our attention from one to the other. 
The conclusion Harman draws from this asymmetry between paintings and 
visual experiences is that mental paint is not introspectively accessible. 
However, this is a non-sequitur because it rests on the unwarranted assump-
tion that if the object of representation is introspectively accessible, then 
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the vehicle of representation can only be introspectively accessible if it can 
be introspectively distinguished from the object of representation. This as-
sumption is unwarranted because there is nothing in the original definition 
of mental paint that places such a constraint as introspective distinguisha-
bility from the object of representation on the introspective accessibility of 
mental paint. Mental paint consists, recall, in those properties by virtue of 
which an experience is of the object that it is of, and the question whether 
mental paint is introspectively accessible is the question whether those prop-
erties are introspectively accessible: if they are accessible, mental paint is 
accessible; if not, not. Accordingly, the fact that the mental paint is not 
introspectively distinguishable from the properties of the object of experi-
ence has no tendency to show that the mental paint is not introspectively 
accessible. Once the unwarranted assumption in question is discarded, it is 
clear that just the opposite is indeed true: the fact that the mental paint is 
not introspectively distinguishable from the properties of the object of ex-
perience supports the thesis that the former is as introspectively accessible 
as the latter and, at one remove, the thesis that the two are identical. 
 The truth of the identity thesis is what makes visual experiences (and 
other perceptual experiences), at least to some extent, philosophically trou-
bling and fascinating. It captures, for instance, what various philosophers 
have, on one clear interpretation, meant by claiming that visual experiences 
are “self-presenting” states, that they are such that their objects present 
themselves to the subject without any other intermediary objects function-
ing as representational mediums.16 An interesting philosophical question 
                                                 
16  For a theory of knowledge that builds on a notion of self-presenting states, see 
Chisholm (1966). However, note that the notion of self-presenting states Chisholm 
adopts is, unlike the interpretation I prefer of that notion, more epistemological 
than ontological. According to Chisholm, a self-presenting state is such that if the 
subject is in that state, then it is evident to her that she is in that state (or, 
roughly, she is justified in believing that she is in that state). I believe but will not 
argue that one can consistently hold that there are self-presenting states in the 
ontological sense of the term without there being self-presenting states in Chis-
holm’s epistemological sense of the term. (Additionally, one might argue, though 
I will not in this paper, that the connection between the epistemological and on-
tological notions of self-presenting states is that the fact that their objects present 
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here is how such self-presenting states are to be accounted for, where the 
duality of the object of representation and the vehicle of representation (in 
our case, mental paint) collapses into a peculiar sort of unity. Furthermore, 
the thesis that mental paint is the same as properties of the object of expe-
rience accords well with William James’ following eloquent characterization 
of the history of philosophy of perception:  
The whole philosophy of perception from Democritus’s time 
downwards has been just one wrangle over the paradox that what 
is evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in 
outer space and in a person’s mind. ‘Representative’ theories of 
perception avoid the logical paradox, but on the other hand they 
violate the reader’s sense of life, which knows no intervening men-
tal image but seems to see the room and the book immediately 
just as they physically exist. (James 1904, 81) 
Consider the painting of a unicorn again. The painting of a unicorn does 
not give rise to a problem similar in structure to the problem (or “the par-
adox”) that we encounter in the case of visual experience. In the case of the 
painting, “what is evidently one reality” is not (and does not appear to be) 
“in two places at once,” both out there in the wilderness as a canvas-inde-
pendent object and on the canvas: the unicorn is not (represented as being) 
on the canvas, and the canvas is not the unicorn. And, this is plausibly 
because the properties of the vehicle of a pictorial representation and the 
properties of the object of a pictorial representation are different and can 
be clearly distinguished. However, in the case of visual experience, James 
points out, what is evidently one reality is (or appears to be) in two places 
at once, both in outer space and in the experience. And, this is plausibly 
because the properties of the vehicle of a visual representation (that is, 
mental paint) and the properties of the object of a visual representation 
                                                 
themselves without any other intermediary objects (the ontological notion) expla-
ins why it is difficult to see how one can be in those states without its being 
evident to one that one is in those states (the epistemological notion).) For an 
excellent discussion of the notion of self-presenting states, see Lehrer (2002). 
Lehrer is emphatic that in the case of conscious mental states including visual 
experiences, the distinction between the vehicle of representation and the object 
of representation disappears (Lehrer 2002, 422, 426). 
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cannot be distinguished and indeed are identical. Why does the unicorn, an 
object distinct from the visual experience of a unicorn, appear to be in (in 
some clear sense) the visual experience of a unicorn (but not in the painting 
of a unicorn)? The answer is that the properties of the vehicle of a visual 
experience cannot be distinguished from the properties of its object, while 
the properties of the vehicle of a pictorial representation can be distin-
guished from the properties of its object.17 This means that the problem 
that James thinks defines “the whole philosophy of perception from 
Democritus’s time downwards” arises because of the indistinguishability or 
identity of the mental paint and the properties of the objects of a visual 
experience.  
 There are three objections I want to address, in an order ascending in 
force, against the identity thesis and one objection regarding the bearing of 
the identity thesis on Harman’s defense of functionalism. First, it might be 
objected that the identity thesis entails the thesis that visual experiences 
present us with mental paint, which is in turn what only a sense-datum 
theorist would wish to endorse. So, the objection goes, since the sense-da-
tum theory is false, the identity thesis must also be false. 
 This objection trades on the ambiguity of the term ‘mental paint.’ The 
sense in which the sense-datum theorist defends the thesis that visual ex-
periences present us with mental paint is not necessarily the sense in which 
the identity thesis entails that visual experiences present us with mental 
paint. The sense-datum theory holds that visual experiences present us with 
mental paint in the sense that they present us with mental (or internal) 
objects and properties rather than public (or external) objects and proper-
ties. The paint we are presented with in having visual experiences is, on 
(a traditional version of) that theory, mental in the sense that the objects 
and properties we thereby see (or “sense”) are such things that can only be 
‘located’ in the subject’s mind. However, the sense in which the identity 
thesis entails that visual experiences present us with mental paint is con-
sistent with the thesis that the paint we are presented with in having visual 
experiences is not mental, that the objects and properties we see are such 
things that can (only) be located in the public (or external) world. On this 
                                                 
17  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing on this issue. 
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sense, to say that visual experiences present us with mental paint is to say 
that visual experiences present us with those properties by virtue of which 
those experiences represent their objects and properties, whether those ob-
jects and properties themselves be mental or not. Briefly put, mental paint 
in the sense that is of concern to us need not be mental in the sense-datum 
theorist’s sense and, accordingly, visual experiences may present us with 
mental paint in the former sense without presenting us with mental paint 
in the latter sense.  
 Secondly, it might be objected that the argument I have presented for 
the identity thesis works only if, for Harman, the properties an experience 
represents its object as having are the properties of that object; however, if 
the properties an experience represents its object as having are the proper-
ties of that object, then it is not possible for the experience to be illusionary 
or hallucinatory (or to misrepresent its object in one way or another). Since 
Harman explicitly allows that possibility (34), as any bona fide representa-
tionalist would do, Harman should not be viewed as holding that the prop-
erties an experience represents its object as having are the properties of that 
object. 
 There are two things I would like to say in response. First, the thesis 
that the properties a visual experience represents its object as having are 
the properties of that object does not exclude the possibility of misrepre-
sentation. Suppose that there is a red cup before me on the table, which 
my visual experience represents as green. In that case, the object of my 
experience is a green cup, and it is actually because the object of my 
experience is a green cup that my experience misrepresents what is really 
there (or is illusory). Secondly, Harman’s treatment of hallucination as 
a form of perceptual misrepresentation supports the thesis that he holds 
that the properties an experience represents its object as having are the 
properties of that object. Suppose that it looks to Eloise as if there is 
a tree before her, while there is no such thing in the environment. In such 
a case, Harman says, “what Eloise sees before her is a tree, whether or 
not it is a hallucination. That is to say, the content of her visual experi-
ence is that she is presented with a tree, not with an idea of a tree” (36, 
emphasis mine). It is clear that the object of Eloise’s experience (“what 
she sees before her”) can be a tree, as Harman claims, only because her 
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experience represents it as being a tree, given that there is ex hypothesi 
no tree in the environment.18 
 Thirdly, it might be objected that it does not make sense, or is at least 
odd, to say that my experience of the redness of the coffee cup is red or to 
say that my experience of the coffee-cup shape of the coffee cup is coffee-
cup shaped: experiences can neither be red nor be coffee-cup shaped. Given 
that the mental paint consists in the properties by virtue of which my ex-
perience is of the object that it is of, then, the objection goes, it seems that 
claiming that the mental paint is the same as the properties of the object 
of experience, I am committed to make such absurd or at least odd remarks. 
Hence, the mental paint cannot be the same as the properties of the object 
of experience.  
 I would like to respond to this objection by reiterating the distinction 
between experiencing act and mental paint. I agree that experiences qua 
experiencing acts cannot have such properties as color or shape, but it is 
clear that the identity thesis does not imply anything to the contrary, given 
that mental paint is not experiencing act. Furthermore, just as one can 
consistently claim that the object of experience is red without claiming that 
the experience itself is red, one can also consistently claim that the mental 
paint is red without claiming that the experience itself is red, if the identity 
thesis is true. However, the basic concern behind the objection might per-
haps be clarified by emphasizing that mental paint is the properties of an 
experience by virtue of which the experience is of the object that it is of, 
and hence, that if mental paint is the same as such properties of the object 
of experience as redness and being coffee-cup shaped, then one cannot avoid 
the conclusion that those properties might be (and, in some cases, are) the 
properties of an experience. My reply now is twofold. First, it is not clear 
                                                 
18  The notion of the object of experience Harman has in mind is very similar to the 
notion of the object of experience Valberg (1992) defines in terms of what is present 
in experience: “By an ‘object of experience’ we shall mean something present in 
experience: something which is right there, available for us to pick out or focus on, 
and refer to demonstratively” (Valberg 1992, 21–22). Of course, however, Harman 
rejects the conclusion of what Valberg calls “the problematic reasoning,” that “what 
is present in experience (present to us, present) is always an internal object; that 
external objects are never actually present to us” (Valberg 1992, 19).  
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that we cannot sensibly talk about redness (and being coffee-cup shaped) 
being a property of an experience, where by “experience,” we mean mental 
paint but not experiencing act. If the paint in a painting representing a red 
object might be red, then it is not clear that experiences qua mental paints 
(but not qua experiencing acts) representing a red object cannot be red. 
Secondly, even if it is agreed that there is no sense in which redness might 
be a property of an experience, the allegedly problematic consequence fol-
lows only on the condition that mental paint is to be defined as the prop-
erties of an experience by virtue of which the experience is of the object 
that it is of. This problem disappears simply by devising a technical term 
such as “a property featuring in an experience” and define mental paint as 
the properties featuring in an experience by virtue of which the experience 
is of the object that it is of, where a property features in an experience just 
in case that property is either a property of the experience or a property of 
one of its (same-level) “components” (such as its object). A definition along 
these lines adequately captures all the relevant contours of the dialectic here 
without simply begging the question against the identity thesis. (The anti-
functionalist, for instance, is to be construed, on this interpretation, as 
claiming that there are some properties featuring in [but not necessarily of] 
an experience but left out by the functionalist story.) This being so, how-
ever, Harman’s original distinction between properties of the object of ex-
perience and properties of the experience of an object, where mental paint 
belongs to the latter, has deservedly taken its hold in the literature, and it 
is best, I believe, to keep it as it is because it is crisp and sharp; however, 
it must be noted that the sort of of-ness deployed in the articulation of 
mental paint is better taken with a grain of salt.  
 The final objection I want to consider concerns the bearing of the iden-
tity thesis on Harman’s defense of functionalism against the argument from 
the intrinsic properties of experience. It might be argued that the truth of 
the identity thesis does not threaten Harman’s defense of functionalism. 
After all, it might be claimed, Harman holds that, given its concern with 
the nature of experience but not with the nature of the objects of experience, 
properties of the object of experience pose no problem for functionalism; 
and, if mental paint is identical to properties of the object of experience, as 
the identity thesis claims, then a proper response available to Harman is 
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simply that as with properties of the object of experience, mental paint 
poses no problem for functionalism.  
 However, this objection misapprehends the structure of the dialectic be-
tween Harman the functionalist and the anti-functionalist. The anti-func-
tionalist originally argues that introspection reveals that there are some 
intrinsic properties of experience, properties which, given its exclusive con-
cern with relational features of experience, functionalism is not in a position 
to account for. Harman’s response is that the anti-functionalist argument 
commits the fallacy of confusing mental paint with properties of the object 
of experience. According to Harman, introspection reveals properties of the 
object of experience, which is not to be confused with mental paint, prop-
erties of the experience by virtue of which it represents what it does. How-
ever, the point is that if the identity thesis is true, then properties of the 
object of experience are properties of the experience by virtue of which it 
represents what it does: the identification of mental paint with properties 
of the object of experience entails that pace Harman, the anti-functionalist 
argument cannot be rightly accused of illegitimately conflating the proper-
ties of the experience of an object with the properties of the object of an 
experience. In other words, if the identity thesis is true, then among the 
properties introspecting reveals about a given experience are its intrinsic 
properties, and Harman’s response is thereby undermined.19 
                                                 
19  The central aim of this paper is to argue that Harman fails to defend functiona-
lism against an objection from the intrinsic properties of experience. Still, I wish to 
make a number of points about how the truth of the identity thesis bears on repre-
sentationalism, the view that the phenomenal character of a given experience (“what 
it is like” to have that experience) is exhausted (Block 1995, 20) by its representa-
tional content, especially given that the philosophical focus with respect to experien-
tial transparency has shifted away from functionalism and towards representationa-
lism. There are two broadly distinct alternatives concerning the representationalist 
conception of mental paint. On one alternative, the sense the representationalist 
attributes to ‘mental paint’ is the same as Harman’s (i.e. properties by virtue of 
which an experience represents what it does), and the representationalist argues that 
the intrinsic qualities that we are aware of when we introspect our experiences are 
only those properties of the object of experience, which figure in the “content” of 
experience, but that we are never aware of mental paint (in Harman’s sense). If the 
identity thesis is true, then the representationalist is mistaken to think that we are 
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 I want to stress this point because it is very important. Harman’s ob-
jection to the anti-functionalist arguments from the intrinsic qualities of 
experiences is captured by the idea that when one attends to one’s experi-
ence of the redness of an apple, one is not aware of an intrinsic quality of 
the experience but of an intrinsic quality of the apple. Harman argues that 
since redness is not (and is not experienced as) a quality of the experience, 
the fact that a functional definition of the visual experience of redness does 
not capture that quality does not detract from the truth or plausibility of 
that definition. However, if mental paint by definition consists in properties 
of the experience by virtue of which it represents what it does, then given 
that, as I have argued, the identity thesis is true, redness is not only a prop-
erty of the object of experience but also a property of (or, using the jargon 
introduced above, featuring in) the experience by virtue of which it repre-
sents what it does. So, the anti-functionalist defending the argument above 
is to be interpreted as claiming that redness, that very feature of the object 
of experience, is a feature of my experience that resists a functionalist treat-
ment. The anti-functionalist need not deny and indeed might fully embrace 
Harman’s point that redness is a quality of the object of my experience but 
still consistently, and plausibly, argue that that point hardly defuses the 
objection that redness is a quality of (or in) my experience that is left out by 
a functionalist account. The upshot is that Harman’s distinction between 
properties of the object of experience and mental paint does not help the 
functionalist because the anti-functionalist cannot be confusing the two, given 
their identity: Harman’s attempt to defuse the anti-functionalist arguments 
from the qualities of experiences misfires and is therefore unsuccessful. 
                                                 
never aware of mental paint. On another alternative, the sense the representationa-
list attributes to ‘mental paint’ is different from Harman’s and the representationa-
list argues that we are never aware of mental paint in that (different) sense. What 
bearing the truth of the identity thesis has on representationalism depends on how 
that sense is specified, and the possibility that the identity thesis is consistent with 
representationalism is left open. So, the answer to the question regarding the bearing 
of the identity thesis on representationalism requires the clarification of the notion 
of mental paint as the representationalist conceives it, a task which falls beyond the 
scope of this paper and must await another occasion. (Thanks to an anonymous 
reviewer for raising this worry.) 
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